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Abstract
We use data on publicly traded U.K. ﬁrms to investigate whether ﬁnancing choices differ
systematically with R&D intensity. As well as looking at a balance sheet measure of the
debt/assets ratio, we also consider the probability of raising ﬁnance by issuing new equity,
and the shares of bank debt and secured debt in total debt. We ﬁnd a nonlinear relationship
with the debt/assets ratio: ﬁrms that report positive but low R&D use more debt ﬁnance than
ﬁrms that report no R&D, but the use of debt ﬁnance falls with R&D intensity among those
ﬁrms that report R&D. We ﬁnd a simpler relationship with the probability of issuing new
equity: Firms that report R&D are more likely to raise funds by issuing shares than ﬁrms that
report no R&D, and this probability increases with R&D intensity. The shares of bank debt
and secured debt in total debt are both lower for ﬁrms that report R&D compared to those that
do not, and tend to fall as R&D intensity rises. We discuss possible explanations for these
patterns. (JEL: G32, O31, D21)
1. Introduction
This short paper explores U.K. ﬁrm-level data to shed further light on whether
more innovative ﬁrms make different ﬁnancing choices, compared to less
innovative ﬁrms. We do not attempt to provide a deﬁnitive answer or explana-
tion here, but report patterns suggesting that further research on this subject is
likely to be fruitful. This note forms part of a wider program of theoretical and
empirical research investigating ways in which more innovative ﬁrms are
distinctive in various aspects of their organization.
1
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1. See, for example, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2003).
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on technological characteristics, but suggest reasons why more innovative ﬁrms
may favor particular sources of ﬁnance.
One approach emphasizes bankruptcy costs.
2 These are likely to be rela-
tively low for ﬁrms with a high proportion of tangible capital among their assets,
particularly property, and equipment associated with generally applicable tech-
nologies. They are likely to be higher for innovative ﬁrms with a higher proportion
of intangible assets, such as knowledge and reputation, and with more special-
ized equipment. For a given level of debt, the risk of bankruptcy may also be
higher. Both factors suggest that more innovative ﬁrms are likely to be less
reliant on debt ﬁnance, to minimize expected bankruptcy costs.
Another approach emphasizes agency costs and informational asymmetries
between investors and ﬁrms’ managers or entrepreneurs. Thus, Myers and
Majluf (1984) point to dilution costs of issuing outside equity when managers
are better informed than outside investors about the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial prospects.
More speciﬁcally, by selling equity to outside investors, the ﬁrm’s current
owners may signal that its future prospects are less than excellent, otherwise
they would have chosen instead to remain the full residual claimant on the ﬁrm’s
revenues (e.g., by issuing debt, rather than equity). This signalling problem
leads to new share issues being underpriced, which imposes a dilution cost on
the ﬁrm’s initial owners.
Now, it is likely that for more innovative ﬁrms there will be a greater degree
of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders, and hence these
dilution costs will tend to be higher. If so, new equity will be a particularly
expensive source of ﬁnance for these ﬁrms. On the other hand, more innovative
ﬁrms are also likely to generate more attractive investment opportunities than
less innovative ﬁrms. If so, they are also likely to be more reliant on external
ﬁnance from either debt or new equity than less innovative ﬁrms, who are more
likely to have sufﬁcient internal funds to ﬁnance all their desired investment
expenditures. Myers and Majluf’s “pecking order” theory of capital structure
thus suggests that more innovative ﬁrms are likely to be more reliant on external
sources of funds, but are likely to favor debt over new equity among external
sources, to avoid these relatively high dilution costs.
A third approach emphasizes control rights.
3 Here the idea is that the lower
the amount of tangible wealth or assets inside a ﬁrm, the more outside investors
will insist on having control rights over the ﬁrm’s decisions in order to satisfy
their ex ante participation constraint. Firms will certainly try ﬁrst to fund
investment from their retained earnings in order to relax the participation
constraint of outside investors; but then, as more investment funds are required,
2. See Brealey and Myers (2003), Chapter 18.
3. See Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart (1995).
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ﬁrm defaults on its repayment obligations); and it is only when the project’s size
(or scope) becomes sufﬁciently large and/or when assets becomes sufﬁciently
intangible that ﬁrms will allocate fuller control rights to outside investors by
issuing new equity. To the extent that more innovative ﬁrms have more attractive
investment opportunities and less tangible assets, this approach predicts that
they will tend to be more reliant on new equity ﬁnance. This alternative theory
of the pecking order thus also predicts that more innovative ﬁrms are likely to
be more reliant on external funds, but suggests that they may favour new equity
rather than debt among these external sources.
In this paper we present evidence on R&D intensity and ﬁnancial structure
from a panel of U.K. listed companies over the period 1990–2002, which we
then compare with the predictions of these theories. Our empirical analysis ﬁrst
considers a balance sheet measure of the importance of debt in the ﬁrm’s capital
structure. It then investigates the probability that the ﬁrm raises funds by issuing
new equity, and the composition of the ﬁrm’s total debt.
There exists already a substantial empirical literature on the ﬁnancing of
R&D activities.
4 While many papers in this literature focus on ﬁnancing
constraints as a source of underinvestment in R&D, we are interested here in the
nature of more general ﬁnancial choices made by high-tech or innovative ﬁrms.
Kaplan and Stro ¨mberg (2000) provide interesting evidence on the nature of
ﬁnancial contracts in high-tech ﬁrms, suggesting that venture capital contracts
are consistent with the predictions of the control rights theory.
5 Carlin and
Mayer (1999) also point to regularities in the relationship between a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing mode and its type of productive activities. The empirical literature on
capital structure often includes information on R&D activities as control vari-
ables,
6 without focusing on the ﬁnancial behavior of innovative ﬁrms, and there
is relatively little empirical evidence from outside the United States.
The rest of this short paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
data and presents our main empirical results. Section 3 summarizes the ﬁndings,
relates them to the theoretical approaches outlined in this introduction, and
ﬁnally discusses possible extensions of the work.
2. R&D Intensity and Financial Structure
We use data from published accounts for an unbalanced panel of 900 companies
whose shares are listed on the London Stock Exchange, over the period
4. Hall (2002) provides an excellent survey.
5. See also Lerner (1992, 1995) on venture capital ﬁnancing.
6. See, for example, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984).
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worldwide activities, and not only to their operations in the United Kingdom.
Our sample includes ﬁrms whose main activity is in manufacturing, extraction
or construction, but excludes ﬁrms whose main activity is in the service sector,
including ﬁnance. Further details of the sample and the variables we use are
provided in the Appendix.
Reporting of R&D expenditure became compulsory for large and medium-
sized U.K. ﬁrms in 1989, which is why we focus on data from 1990 onwards.
Not all ﬁrms in our sample are larger than the size threshold at which R&D
reporting becomes compulsory, but we have checked that all the results we
present here are robust to the exclusion of the smaller listed companies from our
sample. The accounting deﬁnition of R&D expenditure follows closely the
OECD Frascati Manual classiﬁcation, and there were no tax reasons for reported
R&D expenditures to be exaggerated in the United Kingdom over this period.
Table 1 shows that 43% of our sample ﬁrms report positive R&D expen-
diture in at least one year, and positive R&D is observed in 38% of our 6,501
ﬁrm-year observations. Among those observations with positive R&D, the
distribution of R&D intensity (R&D/sales) is highly skewed, as shown in Table
2. Not only is the mean of 3.09% considerably higher than the median of 1.34%,
it is even marginally higher than the upper quartile.
2.1. The Debt/Assets Ratio
Table 3 presents regression results for models of the ratio of total debt to total
assets. Both debt and assets variables are book values reported on company
balance sheets. Total debt includes liabilities with a maturity of less than one
year, as well as longer term liabilities, but excludes trade credits and debits.
Total assets includes current assets, as well as tangible and intangible ﬁxed
assets.
Column 1 reports a basic speciﬁcation in which the explanatory variables
are a zero/one dummy that identiﬁes observations on ﬁrms that ever report
positive R&D expenditure, and the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity. Year dummies are
TABLE 1. Share of ﬁrms/observations with positive R&D
Fraction with positive R&D
Firms 43.6%
Observations 38.1%
TABLE 2. Distribution of R&D intensity (observations with positive R&D)
Mean Std deviation Median Lower quartile Upper quartile
3.09% 7.44% 1.34% 0.54% 3.03%
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cycle effects. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on the R&D ﬁrm
dummy,
7 and a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on the R&D intensity variable.
This pattern indicates a nonlinear relationship between the debt/assets ratio
and the ﬁrm’s R&D proﬁle. Firms with both high R&D intensity, and those with
zero R&D, tend to use less debt ﬁnance than ﬁrms with positive but less
intensive R&D activity. The overall effect of R&D spending on gearing be-
comes negative when R&D reaches around 10% of sales, which occurs for
around 5% of the R&D performing ﬁrms in our sample. Most of these ﬁrms are
in pharmaceuticals, instrument engineering, or telecommunication equipment.
Column 2 shows that this pattern is robust to the inclusion of additional
control variables. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive effect of ﬁrm size on gearing,
and a signiﬁcant negative effect of proﬁtability, but these factors are not highly
collinear with our R&D variables. Column 3 shows that this pattern is also
robust to including a set of 20 sector dummies, and column 4 conﬁrms robust-
ness to both these sets of controls.
Columns 5 and 6 report within groups or “ﬁxed effects” estimates of these
speciﬁcations, which allow for permanent unobserved heterogeneity across
7. Very similar results were obtained using a dummy variable set to one only for observations
where positive R&D is reported. These dummies were too collinear to determine whether capital
structure tends to be different for ﬁrms or for observations with positive R&D.
TABLE 3. Total debt as a share of total assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable Total debt/total assets
Time effects Year Year Year Year Year Year








R&D 0.023 0.023 0.032 0.030
ﬁrm
dummy
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
R&D/sales 0.228 0.384 0.170 0.315 0.245 0.302
(0.043)*** (0.075)*** (0.041)*** (0.079)*** (0.110)** (0.146)**
Employees 0.710 0.519 0.103
(millions) (0.129)*** (0.123)*** (0.320)
Real sales 0.004 0.011 0.010
growth (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)*
Proﬁtability 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)***
Constant 0.179 0.173 0.177 0.174 0.171 0.173
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Observations 6501 5888 6501 5888 6501 5888
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
R-squared statistics in columns (5) and (6) exclude variation explained by ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.
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identify the effect of our time-invariant “ﬁrm reports R&D” dummy variable.
Perhaps surprisingly, given that there is relatively little within-ﬁrm variation in
R&D intensity,
8 we continue to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative effect of R&D
intensity on the debt/assets ratio. This indicates that, for the same ﬁrm, an increase
in R&D intensity is associated with a lower debt/assets ratio; the negative coefﬁcient
reported in earlier columns is not simply reﬂecting cross-sectional differences
between ﬁrms with low and high R&D intensities.
2.2. New Equity Issues
The results presented in the previous subsection indicate that reliance on equity
ﬁnance tends to increase with R&D intensity among ﬁrms that report R&D,
although also tends to be higher for ﬁrms that report no R&D compared to ﬁrms
with positive but low R&D expenditures.
9 However these balance sheet mea-
sures do not distinguish between ﬁnance raised by issuing new equity, and
ﬁnance from “internal equity” or retained proﬁts.
Information on ﬁnance obtained by issuing new shares is available from the
ﬂow of funds statement in U.K. company accounts. Around 80% of the ﬁrms in
this sample report issuing new equity at least once during our sample period.
To explore whether more innovative ﬁrms are more likely to use new equity
ﬁnance, Table 4 reports logit regression models where the dependent variable is
one for an observation in which new equity is issued, and zero otherwise.
10
Column 1 indicates that the probability of issuing new equity is higher for ﬁrms
that report R&D compared to ﬁrms that do not report R&D, and tends to
increase with R&D intensity among those ﬁrms with positive R&D. Column 2
shows that larger, faster growing, and more proﬁtable ﬁrms are also more likely
to issue new equity, but these control variables do not change our basic results
for the R&D variables. Columns 3 and 4 show that these results are robust to the
inclusion of industry dummies.
Columns 5 and 6 report conditional or ﬁxed effects logit speciﬁcations,
which again control for the effect of permanent unobserved heterogeneity across
ﬁrms in their propensity to issue new equity. Not surprisingly, this eliminates
8. A regression of R&D intensity on year dummies and ﬁrm dummies yields an R
2 of 0.95; the
within groups regressions in columns 5 and 6 rely on the residual variation to identify the effect
of R&D intensity. In contrast, a regression of R&D intensity on year dummies and industry
dummies yields an R
2 of only 0.2.
9. We conﬁrmed that models for the book value of equity relative to total assets are essentially
a mirror image of those reported in Table 3. They are not the exact mirror image because both trade
debits and deferred taxation are excluded from our measure of total debt.
10. Similar results were obtained in speciﬁcations where the dependent variable was deﬁned to
be one only if the funds raised from the equity issue exceeded 1% of total sales. This was intended
to exclude cases where equity was issued in relation to share-based remuneration, rather than to
ﬁnance signiﬁcant investment spending.
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of R&D intensity. Again this suggests that, for the same ﬁrm, an increase in
R&D activity is associated with a higher probability of raising ﬁnance from new
equity.
2.3. The Composition of Debt
U.K. company accounts report a breakdown of total debt between bank and
non-bank sources, and between secured and unsecured debt. Columns 1 and 2
of Table 5 report simple regression models of the share of bank debt in total
debt, while Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 report corresponding speciﬁcations for
the share of unsecured debt in total debt.
These results indicate that ﬁrms that report R&D are likely to borrow a
smaller proportion of their total debt from banks, and the share of bank debt in
total debt tends to fall further as R&D intensity increases. Conversely, the share
of unsecured debt tends to be higher for ﬁrms that report R&D, and tends to rise
further as R&D intensity increases, although the latter result is only weakly
signiﬁcant. We note that these results on R&D intensity are also not robust to
the inclusion of ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects; that is, we cannot rule out the
possibility that unobserved characteristics of ﬁrms, that happen to be correlated
with R&D activities, may be driving the effects of R&D intensity reported in
Table 5.
TABLE 4. Logit regressions of probability that new equity is issued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable Positive amount of new equity issued
Time effects Year Year Year Year Year Year








R&D ﬁrm 0.511 0.449 0.650 0.526
dummy (0.064)*** (0.070)*** (0.071)*** (0.079)***
R&D/sales 6.2230 7.293 5.166 7.156 5.059 17.933
(1.310)*** (1.585)*** (1.453)*** (1.796)*** (3.433) (6.603)***
Employees 29.726 28.609 9.273
(millions) (4.073)*** (4.141)*** (12.379)
Real sales 1.112 1.060 0.880
growth (0.155)*** (0.158)*** (0.207)***
Proﬁtability 0.125 0.118 0.157
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.092)*
Constant 18.266 20.395 19.162 20.221
(0.117)*** (0.126)*** (0.264)*** (0.295)***
Observations 5445 4936 5445 4936 3794 3374
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Our results suggest that the ﬁnancial behavior of more innovative ﬁrms, as
indicated by the presence and extent of R&D expenditure, differs from the
ﬁnancial behavior of less innovative ﬁrms in a number of ways.
In Section 2.1 we found an interesting nonlinear relationship with the use of
debt ﬁnancing, as measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Firms with
positive R&D tend to use more debt than ﬁrms with zero R&D, but among the
R&D performing sub-sample the use of debt declines with R&D intensity.
Those ﬁrms with the highest R&D intensities in our sample tend to have the
lowest levels of gearing. In Section 2.2 we found a simpler relationship between
R&D behaviour and the probability that ﬁrms raise ﬁnance by issuing new
equity. Firms with positive R&D are more likely to issue equity than ﬁrms with
zero R&D, and the use of new equity increases further with R&D intensity.
Those ﬁrms with the highest R&D intensities in our sample thus tend to be the
most likely to use new equity ﬁnance.
The overall picture that emerges from these two sets of results appears to be
largely consistent with the control rights approach, whereby the pecking order
between internal ﬁnance, debt and outside equity is driven by the interplay
between the size of desired investment, the tangibility of assets, the allocation
of control rights, and the investors’ participation constraint. More speciﬁcally,
as we move from less innovative ﬁrms to consider ﬁrms with increasing R&D
intensities: First, more innovative ﬁrms may have more attractive investment
opportunities and thus become more reliant on external sources of ﬁnance, but
TABLE 5. The composition of debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable Bank debt/total debt Unsecured debt/total debt
Time effects Year Year Year Year
Group effects Industry Industry Industry Industry
R&D ﬁrm 0.056 0.031 0.191 0.157
dummy (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***
R&D/sales 0.576 0.526 0.174 0.302
(0.116)*** (0.211)** (0.122) (0.231)
Employees 2.792 3.294
(millions) (0.359)*** (0.461)***




Constant 0.716 0.719 0.591 0.604
(0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)***
Observations 5971 5411 6043 5484
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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however, more highly innovative ﬁrms will have no choice but to issue outside
equity in order to meet the investors’ participation constraint. This can poten-
tially explain why the probability of issuing new equity rises monotonically with
R&D intensity (as we found in Section 2.2), while the use of debt ﬁnance starts
to decline eventually as R&D intensity increases (as we found in Section 2.1).
Our ﬁndings do not ﬁt so well with the dilution costs approach based on
informational asymmetries between ﬁrms and their outside ﬁnanciers. On the
one hand this approach also predicts that more innovative ﬁrms should rely
more on external ﬁnance (both debt and new equity) than less innovative ﬁrms.
On the other hand it suggests that the most innovative ﬁrms should ﬁnd new
equity ﬁnance particularly expensive, which is difﬁcult to reconcile with our
ﬁnding that among U.K. listed ﬁrms, those with the highest R&D intensities are
the most likely to issue new equity (Section 2.2).
The extent to which bankruptcy costs may help to account for these patterns
remains to be explored more carefully. On the one hand, publicly traded U.K.
ﬁrms have low bankruptcy rates, so that our sample may not be the best place
to look for evidence that bankruptcy costs are a major inﬂuence on borrowing
behaviour. On the other hand, there is signiﬁcant variation across listed ﬁrms in
corporate bond rates, which suggests there may also be signiﬁcant variation in
the perceived risk of bankruptcy. In any case, bankruptcy costs alone cannot
explain the ﬁnding that, over some range, more innovative ﬁrms are more highly
leveraged than less innovative ﬁrms.
In Section 2.3 we analyzed the relationship between R&D intensity and the
composition of debt. The shares of bank debt and secured debt in total debt are
both lower for ﬁrms that report R&D compared to those that do not, and tend
to fall as R&D intensity rises.
11 The signiﬁcance of these patterns is however
dominated by cross-sectional differences between ﬁrms, and becomes very
weak when we control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects and rely on time series
variation within the observations on the same ﬁrm for identiﬁcation.
There are several extensions to this line of research that we intend to pursue.
One important development will be to use other indicators of the extent of ﬁrms’
innovative activities than simply their R&D intensity. In this paper, we avoided
some of the problems of reliance on R&D intensity by including industry
dummies—so that in effect we considered whether the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity
was high relative to a sectoral norm—and by controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effects—in which case we further control for the ﬁrm’s normal level of R&D
activity. Nevertheless it will be useful to conﬁrm our results using alternative
technological indicators. One possibility will be to construct ﬁrm-speciﬁc mea-
11. Barclay and Smith (1995) report a somewhat related result, namely that ﬁrms with “higher
growth options,” as measured by the ratio between the market value and the book value of the
ﬁrm’s assets, issue more short-term debt.
285 Aghion, Bond, Klemm, & Marinescu Technology and Financial Structuresures of total factor productivity, relative either to the most productive ﬁrms in
the U.K. industry or worldwide, along the lines of those used at the industry
level by Grifﬁth, Redding, and Van Reenen (2001).
We will also consider a wider range of econometric estimators and speciﬁca-
tions. GMM procedures for dynamic panel data models will allow us to control for
some forms of measurement error. This approach will also allow us to investigate
whether the differences we ﬁnd are temporary or permanent, in the context of
dynamic model speciﬁcations, and to address issues of (Granger) causality.
Finally, a limitation of the present study is that we have considered only
publicly traded U.K. ﬁrms, that are predominantly both large and mature. We
hope that future work will be able to investigate these issues using data for
smaller or newer companies, where differences between more innovative and
less innovative ﬁrms may be even more signiﬁcant.
Appendix
The company accounts data were obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream.
Using the GDP deﬂator (computed from U.K. National Statistics series ABMI
and YBHA) we convert all ﬁnancial variables into constant prices.
Datastream provides a breakdown of ﬁrm sales according to U.K. SIC
codes. We allocate ﬁrms to the industry in which most of their sales occurred.
If they have the same sales in two industries, we pick the one with the highest
reported proﬁts.
We keep industries if we have information on at least 20 ﬁrms. Otherwise
we use a higher level of aggregation. If this also fails we drop the industry from
our sample. We drop all industries in the service sector. This leaves us with 20
industries: Extraction, construction, and 18 manufacturing sectors, at roughly
the two-digit level.
We have kept data cleaning to a minimum, but we do drop observations if:
• total assets are negative, increase by more than 100% or fall by more than
50% in a year;
• total capital employed is negative;
• accounting years are shorter than 11 months or longer than 13 months;
• any variable required for our analysis is missing;
•ﬁ rms report R&D erratically, that is, switch more than once between report-
ing zero and nonzero R&D; and
• bank debt or unsecured debt is greater than total debt.
Our dependent variables are deﬁned as follows:
12
12. Numbers in parentheses refer to Datastream accounts items.
286 Journal of the European Economic Association• Total debt/total assets: Stock of debt repayable in more than one year (321)
plus stock of debt repayable within one year (309) over total assets (392)
• Indicator for new equity issued: A dummy variable equal to one if cash
raised from issue of ordinary equity or preferred stock (429) is positive, and
equal to zero otherwise
• Bank debt/total debt: Total bank debt (275  387) over total debt (321 
309)
• Unsecured debt/total debt: Unsecured debt (274) over total debt (321 
309).
Our R&D variables are deﬁned as follows:
• R&D ﬁrm dummy: A dummy variable equal to one if R&D expenditure
(119) is reported to be positive in at least one year, and equal to zero
otherwise
• R&D intensity: R&D expenditure (119) over total sales (104).
Our control variables are deﬁned as follows:
• Number of employees: Total number of domestic and overseas employees,
including part-time, in millions (219)
• Real sales growth: Growth of real sales (104) over the year
• Proﬁtability: Operating proﬁts (137) over capital stock constructed using the
perpetual inventory method.
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